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I. INTRODUCTION

There is currently a gap in United States' patent law that is threatening American
innovation. The lack of predictability of the patent eligibility of new computer
software has left many to wonder what the future holds for the industry.' This idea
is illustrated by the Global Intellectual Property Center's most recent patent
protection rankings where, for the first time, the Global Intellectual Property Center
2
ranked the United States tenth in patent protection tied with Hungary. To put this
in perspective, the Center ranked the United States as the best country for patents in
2016. 3 The 2017 report cites "uncertainty" in the interpretation of "key decisions"
as a cause for the drop in ranking. 4 This interpretation issue often centers around the
meaning of "abstract concept." Although the patent community has called on the
Supreme Court to better define "abstract concept, ' 5 the Court has failed to provide
any further guidance. This is not due to a lack of opportunity: the Court recently had
the option to give further guidance in hearing Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Coo.,
but it chose to deny the petition for certiorari, to the detriment of certainty within
the intellectual property community.

6

This note will seek to further define the concepts of abstraction and inventive
concepts as they apply to computer software patents. It will begin with a discussion
of the evolution of the patentability of processes and software in general. This
discussion will include a history of the various abstraction tests by combining the
history of statutory law, common law, and federal guidance. It will then provide a
snapshot of the current state of affairs through a description of the current test7
established by the Supreme Court's holding in Alice Coo. v. CLS Bank Internalional
Next, it will provide a background of the facts and procedural posture of Synopgs, Inc.
I See, e.g., Daniel Taylor, Comment, Down the Rabit Hole: Who Will Stand Up for Software Patents
AfterAlice?, 68 ME.L. REv. 217 (2016).
2 Brief for Amicus Curiae The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in Support of
Neither Party at 15-16, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 71 (2017) (No. 16-1288) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (citing GLOBAL
(2017),
IP
INDEX
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CENTER, U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ipindex2017-chart/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017)).
3 GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY CENTER, U.S.

CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL

IP INDEX

(2017), http:// www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017 _Report.pdf (last visited
Aug. 27, 2018).
4 Amicus Brief, supranote 2, at 16. Since this note's acceptance for publication, the 2018 Global
Intellectual Property Center rankings rank the United States as number one for intellectual property;
however, the rankings cite uncertainty over patentability for high-tech sectors as remaining a key
weakness for the country.
5

Laura R. Ford,

PATENTING THE SOCIAL: ALICE, ABSTRACTION, AND FUNCTIONALISM IN

SOFTWARE PATENT CLAMs, 14 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y and Ethics J. 259, 307 (Spring 2016).
6
7

138 S. Ct. 71 (2017).
134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355-2360 (2014).
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v. Mentor Graphics Corp.8 This note will then analyze the current available tests to
determine if a process is abstract through applying them to the facts in Snopys along
with current accepted patents. It will conclude with a discussion of the need for a
new test based on the software's ability to improve a process by making it less
cumbersome.
II. BACKGROUND

The protection of innovative ideas in the United States is as old as the country
itself. The Constitution gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective writings and discoveries." 9 Although the
United States has a history of encouraging patents, the overall attitude towards the
concept of patents has gone through cycles of being in favor to being under fire as
courts have struggled with balancing both the encouragement of innovation and the
prevention of monopolies on ideas. 10
A. STATUTORY HISTORY

In response to anti-patent attitudes, Congress passed the 1952 Act creating Titde
35.11 This Act is the backdrop for today's patent law. 12 There are three relevant
statutes concerning patent eligibility. 35 U.S.C. § 101 allows for any individual who
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, [to] obtain a
patent 113 Section 102 sets forth that the invention must be novel. 14 Finally, section
103 establishes that an invention may not be obvious.' 5 This section goes further to
say an invention is not patentable if a "person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the claimed invention pertains" would know the invention to be obvious. 16 It is §103
that provides the backdrop to this idea of abstraction. Although these three statutes
provide the backdrop for patent law, they do little in the way of dealing with what

8

814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on otbergrounds by Aqua Prods. V. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290

(2016).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS OV-9 - OV-15 (Matthew Bender 2018).
11 Id. at OV- 12.
12 Id.
13 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
14 35 U.S.C. 5 102 (2017).
15 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2017).
16 Id.
10
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exactly is meant for an invention to be nonobvious in the realm of computer
processes. For this question to be answered, one must turn to common law.
B. COMMON LAW HISTORY

The introduction of computer software processes into patent law brought with it
many questions of what software was "obvious" and what software was "novel." The
first major decision dealing with the patentability of computer programming was
Gottschalk v. Benson.' 7 This case centered on the patentability of an algorithm that
"convert[ed] binary-coded decimal ...numerals into pure binary numerals."'1 8 The
Supreme Court held this patent would preempt an entire mathematical formula, and
19
The crucial fact in this decision was that the
would patent the algorithm itself.
in an
patent was not unique to any specific machine but the algorithm itself which
20
essence made it an abstract idea as it would cover known and unknown uses.
The next case the Supreme Court weighed in on concerning the patent eligibility
2
of a process was Bilski v. Kappos. ' The process at issue in this case showed
commodities traders how to hedge against the risk of price changes. The Court
ultimately upheld the circuit court's ruling that the process was not patent eligible
because it attempted to patent an abstract idea, but this case is most notable because
of the Court's rejection of the exclusive use of the "machine-or-transformation test"
applied by the circuit court. 22 The machine-or-transformation test is a two-step
process which addresses patent eligibility. This test determined that a process could
be patent eligible if it was "tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or if it transforms
' 23
a particular article into a different state or thing." The Supreme Court held this test
24
was not the only way to determine if a process is patent eligible. This represents the
first time the Supreme Court addressed the patentability of a process.
The current state of patentability of computer processes results from the Supreme
25
Court's decision in Alice Corp. P0. Ltd. V. CS Bank Int'l. The facts in this case are
similar to those in Bilski as the patent at issue sought to hedge risks. More specifically,
the patent sought to "facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two
26
parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary." This program

409 U.S. 63 (1972).
18 Id. at 64.
17

19 Id. at 72.
20 Id. at 68.
21 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
22 Id. at 612-613.
23 See Kappos, 561 U.S. at 600 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, at 944 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
24 Id. at 612-613.
25 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
26 Id. at 2352.
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calculated if resources existed to pay back a debt. 27 The Court ultimately held such a
program was not patent eligible because it was attempting to patent human ingenuity
as individuals had been performing these functions for years. 28 Alice is also significant
because it provides the current test for determining if a concept is patent eligible: Is
it a patent ineligible concept? If so, is there some type of inventive concept?29
C. AGENCY INVOLVEMENT

Post-Alice, there are many questions regarding what exactly an inventive concept
is, and whether or not the current test is even workable. There has yet to be any
further Supreme Court guidance on this issue, and Congress has not passed any
clarifying legislation. Occasionally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) will release memos on the subject, but these memos are not binding, and
so they do little in the way of actually filling gaps in the law. For example, on May 19,
2016, the USPTO released a memo discussing the Federal Court of Appeal's decision
in Enfish L C v. Microsoft Corp. The USPTO advocated for a new test to determine if
a claim is related to an abstract idea. 30 Although the The first part of the proposed
test seeks to "determine if the claim recites a concept that is similar to concepts
previously found abstract by the courts. '31 The second part of the test is less a step
and more of a conclusion: if one can demonstrate an improvement in computer-related
technology, this is enough to determine a claim is not related to an abstract idea. 32
Not only does this memo not carry the force of law, it also does not really define
what an abstract idea is, at best, it describes abstraction by reference some previous
concept found to meet that test, and obliquely offers that improvements in computer
related technology will usually qualify.
D. SYNOPSYS, INC. V. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORP.

Nowhere is the lack of guidance concerning the patentability of processes more
apparent than with the decisions in Sjynopss, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.33 originating
in the Northern District of California. The facts in Synopsys present a unique issue
concerning the patent eligibility of a computer program that translates human
descriptions of logic boards into hardware components. At issue in Snopsys are three

27 Steven Swan, Note, Plugging the Rabbit Hole: The Supreme Court's Decision in Alice, 2016 UTAH L.
REv. 891 at 892 (2016).
28 Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2356.
29 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
3 Memorandum from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, (May 19, 2016).
31 Id. at 2.
32

Id.

33 814 F.3d

1309 (Fed. Cit. 2016), overruled by Aqua Prods. V. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (2016).
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'34
Together these
different patents, collectively referred to as "the Gregory Patents.
synthesis is
logic
patents describe a type of electronic design automation whereby
35
they
boards;
circuit
performed. These patents are relevant to the process of building
descriptions
these
translates
and
provide for a method that takes human descriptions
36
into hardware components of the circuit board. This process, in its most basic
but the Gregory Patents seek to
the
field,
form, can be performed by a person in
37
perform this process for complex circuit designs. In other words: the Gregory
Patents describe a computer program that takes a simple process and improves it to
make it workable in advanced settings which would not be applicable had the
program not existed.
The Northern District of California held that this program was not patent eligible
because "each of the steps ...can be performed by a skilled designer either mentally
or with pencil and paper."'38 This Northern District Court also cited the fact the
inventors created this process without the use of a computer as a reason to deny the
39
patents.
In its holding, the Northern District Court cites unusual reasons for denying the
patents. One such reason for denying the patent was that the methods did not entail
anything physical;40 however, there is no precedent stating for a method to be patenteligible that it has to involve some physical element. If this were the case, no type of
software could ever be patented as software is inherently nonphysical. The Northern
District Court instead equates the lack of aphysicalelement with the conclusion that
what remains is a mental process, and reasons that mental processes are patent
41
ineligible since they are abstract ideas.
The Northern District Court completely discounted the fact that a human would
never attempt the process described by the Gregory Patents:

"The fact that previously a designer would not have followed the
exact same thought process does not change the analysis. A method
primarily designed for use by a computer is, almost by definition,
going to differ from the manner in which a natural person thinks
'42
through a problem.

34 Id. at 1312.
35 Id.
36 Id.

37 Id. at 1318.
38 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 958, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 963.
41 Id. (dingCyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (2011)).
42 Id. at 966.
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The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision through the use of
the test proposed in Alice.43 The Federal Circuit held that the Gregory Patents did in
fact represent an abstract idea, but concluded the methods were not an inventive
concept. 44 The court claimed that just because an idea might be novel does not
guarantee it is not still abstract. 45 The process set forth by the Gregory Patents was
not an "inventive concept," even though the court recognized the lack of definition
for the term "inventive concept." 46 The unclear reasoning in Synopsys illustrates the
need for further guidance as to what constitutes an inventive concept.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decided not to weigh in on Synopys. 47 This
means that the question of what exactly qualifies as an inventive concept remains an
unresolved issue.

43 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-52. (Fed. Cir. 2016) overruled
on othergrounds by Aqua Prods. V. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (2016).
44 Id. at 1152.
45 Id. at 1151 ("A new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a 5 101 inventive
concept is thus distinct from demonstrating 5 102 novelty.").
46Id.
47 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 138 S. Ct. 71 (2017).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. INAPPLICABIL1TY OF CURRENT ALICE TEST

1. Analysis of Synopys using the Alice test.
The holdings in Synopsys provide evidence proving the Alice test is hostile
towards software patents. In fact, after Alice, over 80% of all software patents have
been denied. 48 The sweeping definition of what is considered an abstract concept,
coupled with the lack of a definition for an inventive concept, are likely causes for
this patent hostility.
a. Patentineligible concept. To ensure the Alice test was not misapplied, this note will
reexamine the test through the facts of Synopys since the Supreme Court has declined
the opportunity to do so. The first step in analyzing the Gregory Patents is to
determine if they represent a patent-ineligible concept. 49 The Supreme Court held a
concept is patent ineligible if it seeks to patent "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
50
[or] abstract ideas."
Translating one computing language into another would not fall under the
categories of laws of nature or natural phenomena, so patent ineligibility would hinge
on if it was an abstract idea. As previously established, there is no set definition for
determining what is abstraction.51
This lack of definition has not prevented the Ninth Circuit from nonetheless
determining a concept is abstract by comparing it to other concepts that have
previously been held to be abstract in Enfsh.52 Although the Enfish decision came two
years after Synopsys, it does little to define abstraction, essentially saying only that one
should compare the concept at issue to precedent.5 3 This is easier said than done,
because each patent is inherently unique and therefore distinguishable. The purpose
of patents is to protect new ideas, so it is inefficient to base a definition of a term
regarding these ideas, which are by their nature different from one another, on what
this term meant for another idea.
Synopsys argued the Gregory Patents were not abstract because they describe
"concrete steps in a computerized process for creating a netlist of hardware
elements. ' 5 4 Meanwhile, the defendant, Mentor Graphics, argued the Gregory

48 Taylor, supra note 1 at 247.
49 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
50 Id. at 2354.
51 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
52

Id.

53 Id.
54

Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 458 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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Patents attempt to patent an abstract idea because they lack any physical element. 5
For the sake of argument, this note will analyze the Gregory Patents as if they
represent an abstract concept. This does not mean that the patents are automatically
ineligible, since the patents still have a chance for redemption with the second part
of the test: determining its status as an inventive concept.
b. Inventive Concept. The second part of the Alice test examines if the idea "contains
an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patenteligible application."5 6 There is no actual definition for what should be considered
an inventive concept or at what level an abstract idea can be considered to have been
sufficiently transformed. Courts have only attempted to define inventive concepts
by saying what they are not. For example, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc. the Supreme Court held that "appending conventional steps, specified at a
high level of generality" to an already known method does not make those steps
patentable. 57 Neither is adding the application of a computer to an abstract idea. 58
The closest the Supreme Court has come to providing a definition of this term comes
at the end of the Alice decision, when it held "[b]ecause ...[the] claims add nothing
of substance to the underlying abstract idea, they too are patent ineligible. 5 9 From
this, one could assume for a concept to be inventive it must add something of
substance to an abstract idea.
The Gregory Patents could easily be considered to add something of substance
to the process of logic circuits' descriptions because they remove the need for the
user to input hardware units when translating hardware descriptive languages. This
process greatly increases the efficiency at which these languages can be converted
allowing for individuals to build increasingly complex circuit boards. This presents a
substantial change that is not synonymous with just adding a computer to the process
because the computer is doing something different than a human would. Because the
methods are dierentbetween a computer and a human, the Gregory Patents do not
preempt any sort of human translation of circuit board descriptions.
The Northern District Court of California notably cited only testimonial evidence
to show the Gregory Patents simply used a computer to apply a preexisting method. 60
The district court cites a deposition in which one of the patent's creators said that he
was responsible for trying to take a manual process and figure out how a computer
1
could do it.6
The patent, on the other hand, describes a new process that allows
users to use hardware description language on more complex circuit elements without
55 Id.

56Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014).
57 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292 (2012).
58Id. at 1301.
59Akce, 134 S. Ct. at 2351.
60Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 958, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
61 Id.
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having to specifically describe the circuit element using an equation. 62 Though a
human could theoreticaly do this process, few individuals would actually attempt this
extremely challenging process because of the knowledge required and the immense
amount of time it would take. 63 Although the district court ultimately determined the
Gregory Patents did not represent inventive concepts, one can see how difficult it is
to reach this conclusion with the current lack of defined terms.
This lack of clearly defined terms has led to some concepts to be patent eligible
while similar concepts have been held to be patent ineligible. Using the logic set forth
in Alice and the district court's decision in Synopys, one of the acclaimed patents of
2015 would likely not pass muster.
2. Analysis offact checkingpatent with Alice test
IPWatchdog ranked Patent 8972321 as the seventh best patent of 2015. 64 Held
65
by IBM, Patent 8972321 describes a method for fact checking statements. 66
Inventors created the patent in response to statements made by political candidates.
The method it describes analyzes the truth of a statement by first breaking it down
into different parts (independent and dependent clauses). The system then uses these
parts to create questions and answers. 67 So if the sentence was "Bill has a red ball,"
the program would divide the sentence into questions and answers: What has a red
ball? - Bill. 68 Once it has these questions and answers, the computer runs the
questions through search engines, compares the results to the answers, and uses the
69
comparison to calculate a truthfulness percentage.
If one tests the patentability of this concept using the Alice test, the seventh-best
patent of 2015 surely fails. First, one must determine if the claim attempts to patent
an illegible concept.7 0 Fact checking is neither a law of nature nor natural
phenomena, so for it to be patent ineligible it would have to be an abstract idea.
Using the logic used in Synopgys, the question to determine if a concept is abstract
would then be to ask whether it is some tangible concept. The truth is not something

62 U.S. Patent No. 5,530,841 (filed June 6, 1995).
63

Id.

(Dec. 28,
10 PATENTS ISSUED IN 2015,
64 IPWatchdog, T-fE TOP
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/28/top-10-patents-issued-201 5/id=64025/.
65 U.S. Patent No. 8972321 (filed Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Fact Checker Patent].

2015),

66 IPWatchdog, supra note 64.
67 Fact Checker Patent, supra note 65.
6 Id.
69

Id.

70 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol26/iss1/8

10

Barnes: Diminishing Uncertainty in Software Patents: After the Supreme Co
2019] DIMINISHING UNCERTAINTY IN SOFTWARE PATENTS

199

a person could physically touch, so the claim would move to the next step of the test,
which is determining whether the claim is inventive. 71
The Northern District Court of California held a claim was not inventive if it took
a method previously known and applied it using a computer. 72 The fact-checking
patents clearly take a previously used method and apply it to a computer. People use
search engines to check the accuracy of another's statements on a daily basis. The
patent itself even acknowledges that individuals can perform this type of fact

checking.73 For these reasons, a court would likely find the fact checking patent is
not inventive which would cause the claim to be patent-ineligible. IBM's factchecking patent states that this method provides a service that once required 80
people to perform; 74 however, according to the district court's holding in Synopys,
this argument should be considered irrelevant in the analysis of a claim's
inventiveness. 75 Following precedent, a court would also likely hold that it does not
matter that the method used in the fact-checking patents might differ a little from
what a human would employ because a human would obviously perform a task in a
76
different way than a computer would.
It is clear from this analysis that, if challenged, the venerated fact-checking patent
would likely not pass the Alice test. So the question is why was it granted a patent in
the first place? Why was a method that eight-year-olds perform granted a patent while
the courts stripped the patent away from a method that can only be used in the
theoretical sense by individuals with immense knowledge of the subject? The Alice
test has left a clear and apparent inconsistency that must be filled, or inventors will
no longer be incentivized to create any new computer software for fear of a lack of
adequate protection.

71

Id. at 2357.

72 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,1301(2012) (citing

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
73 Fact Checker Patent, supra note 65.
74

Id.

75 A'ce, 134 S. Ct. at 2351 (2014).
76 Id.
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A. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REPLACEMENT TESTS

1. Quantifiable improvementproposal
Many possible solutions exist to fix the issues with the current test. One such77
suggestion is to create a test based on "quantifiable improvement to the examples.
This approach would require patent applicants to show some type of quantifiable
78
improvement to the abstract idea involved with the patent. In practice, this would
look very similar to the fact-checking patent whereby IBM noted the method does
79
the work of 80 people.
This solution has its own issues. In his Utah Law Review note, Steven Swan
acknowledges this method does little to help patent holders like S nopgys who have
already filed their patents without this language. 80 The lack of protection for the
earliest software patents represents a major issue as these early patents provide the
foundation for software as society knows it today. To say that an abstract concept is
only inventive if it can show some quantifiable level of improvement would open the
door to patent trolls to challenge early patents simply on the grounds that this type
of language is not explicit in the patent.
Swan's method would also likely open the flood gate to patents as it would allow
almost any software to be patented. Computers inherently perform functions faster
than the average human, so presumably any function performed by a human's brain
could be patented if it was put into software form, because one could quantify how
much more efficient the process would be performed by a computer than by an
individual. With this test, the patent at issue in Bilski could be considered inventive
because a computer can calculate how to hedge an investor's risk quicker than a
person can. 81
2. Allowing some intangibles tofall outside of the abstract concept definition
There is also a push to provide a better definition of what amounts to an abstract
concept. Currently, a split exists a between whether an abstract concept should mean
"anything intangible" or whether abstract concept should not include intangible items
that have a set definition. 82 The latter would exclude intangible items which are

77 Swan,

supra note 27, at 912.
Id.
79 Fact Checker Patent, supra note 65.
80Swan, supra note 27, at 912.
78

81
82

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
See Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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defined by concrete steps (such as the Gregory Patents) from the definition of an
83
abstract concept.
The easier alternative is clearly to consider anything intangible to be abstract. This
would eliminate the responsibility of judges and the USTPO to decide what steps in
a method are properly defined. While some fear that holding all intangible concepts
to be abstract would completely prevent any type of software from being patentable,
the subsequent "inventiveness" inquiry would still provide an effective path to
eligibility.
3. Allowing patents for intangibles that solve problems spedficaljy arising in the realm of
computer networks
Another possible solution was proposed by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
in DDRHoldings,ILC v. Hotels.com., LP.84 The patent at issue sought to solve an issue
in the ecommerce field. 85 When website patrons clicked on advertisements, they were

transported to another site. This caused a disruption in website traffic on the original
page. The patent fixed this issue by taking patrons to a hybrid site when they click on
an advertisement that has components of the original site and the advertised site.
The court distinguished this patent from ineligible concepts like the one in Alice
by noting that this patent exists "to overcome a problem specifically arising in the
realm of computer networks."' 86 The court held this was important because the
patent did not prevent other applications of the concept of stores within stores such
as kiosks. 87 DDR Holdings is notably the only post-Alice case to hold a computer
software to pass the inventive concept test. The Federal Circuit used the problem
solving approach within the Alice framework to help define an inventive concept. 88
In fact, the Federal Circuit cautioned that "not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent." 89 The court held this approach
should not be taken as a standing rule because it would open the door to claim that
any problem solved by some internet-based program was patent eligible. 90
It is possible that a rule similar to the one alluded to in DDR Holdings could be
useful in defining inventive concepts. Although the court was fearful that patent
applicants would simply add an internet dimension to make allideas patentable, this

83 Id.
84 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

85 Id. at
86 Id. at
87 Id. at
88 Id. at
89 Id. at
90

1261-62.
1257.
1258.
1256-59.
1258.

Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
J. INTELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 26:1

concern does not follow from the facts in DDR Holdings.The patent at issue in DDR
91
Holdings focused on an issue that was only present in the realm of the Internet.
From this set of facts, one could glean an appropriate definition of an "inventive
concept": i.e., a concept which solved a problem unique to the applicable industry.
Under this rule, the Gregory Patents would have been upheld. This is because
there was an obvious issue in the world of circuit board design whereby individuals
were unable to create complex circuits because it was too cumbersome to translate
one design language into another if the hardware needed involved complex elements
such as switchboards. 92 The industry problem at issue would be the inability to create
complex design features and the solution would be the advent of a translation method
for complex design without the use of a human.
This rule would also allow for the patent eligibility of the fact-checking patent.
The industry problem would be the need for instantaneous checking of statements
(this patent was applied for during the height of the 2016 presidential election). 93 The
solution to this problem is the use of computer systems to automate the process of
fact-checking, thereby solving the issue of the need for quick confirmation of
statements.
The problem-based approach has received some traction recently. For example,
the District Court of Rhode Island recently upheld a patent which eliminates the need
for business patrons to present two different cards, one to pay and one to receive
rewards benefits. 94 It does this by "encod[ing] the data stream with sentinels."" In
holding that this concept was patent-eligible, the Rhode Island District Court cites
that the "patent overcomes unique technological challenges. '96 The Court then
distinguishes this patent from other failed patents by stating that this patent does not
broadly state that the use of the Internet solves the issue and makes the concept
inventive.

97

Similarly, the District Court of Massachusetts also upheld the use of some
problem solving approach in evaluating patents. 98 The patent at issue in Sophos sought
to solve the problem of the uncertainty of the delivery of electronic messages. 99 This
was accomplished by establishing a server between the sender and the recipient. 1°°

91 Id. at 1257.
92

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).

93 Fact Checker Patent, supra note 65.
94 SCVNGR, Inc. v. DailyGobble, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 263, 270 (D.R-J. 2017).

95

Id. at 264.

96

Id. at 269.

97 Id.
98 Sophos Inc. v. RPOST Holdings, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72699 (2016).
99 Id. at 36-37.
100 Id. at 37.
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The Court held this was enough to pass the muster of the inventive concept element
of the Alice test. 10 1
Although the test in DDR Holdings appears to be gaining traction, there is a
potential hole. Under this rule, it is possible for a court to deny patents, such as the
Gregory Patents, that provide solutions for problems in a way theoretically achievable
by hand, even if no one would actually attempt to do so.
4. Probkm solting approach with workability exception
To fill this hole, it would be beneficial to have an exception for patents which, on
their face, add the use of a computer to solve an issue based on a previously manual
formula which adds something to the method to make it adaptable to a computer
system.
Admittedly, some will argue that this sort of exception will be the beginning of a
slippery slope whereby individuals will eventually be able to patent laws of nature if
a computer is able to perform it faster than a human can. But, in reality, this carve
out is fairly limited, because it would only apply to methods and processes that are
too cumbersome for a human to even attempt in the first place.
The limited nature of this exception is demonstrated by applying the rule to the
patent in Alice. The patent at issue in Alice used a computer to hedge risks by
establishing appropriate third parties. This patent would not fall into the exception
for cumbersomeness because humans often perform this exact function, using third
parties to hedge risks. The patent at issue in Alice is distinguishable from the Gregory
Patents because, although the process in the Gregory Patents was theoretically
implementable, no one would actually attempt to use it; by comparison, the process
in the Alice patent is commonplace.

101Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Patent law exists to encourage human innovation. An individual is not
incentivized to think outside of the box unless he knows that his idea will be
protected. With growing use of technology comes a growing section of the
population with ideas connected directly to the advancement of technology. Some of
these ideas will build upon preexisting methods, but to say that these ideas are wholly
patent-ineligible unnecessarily stops progress. The carve out proposed in this note is
fundamentally necessary so that the United States does not fall further behind as a
producer in the world's technology marketplace.
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